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The Therapeutic Method of Kosawa Heisaku:  
 ‘Religion’ and ‘the Psy Disciplines’1 
 
Christopher Harding, University of Edinburgh 
 
While many psychoanalysts from Freud’s generation up until the late twentieth century 
were generally critical towards – or at the very least ambivalent about – religion, in 
recent years influential voices in psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and psychology have been 
calling for a revision of such attitudes. A raft of new publications has appeared on the 
relationship between religion, on the one hand, and the ‘psy disciplines’2 and mental 
health on the other, alongside initiatives by clinicians both internationally and in 
individual countries such as Japan and the UK aimed at understanding and harnessing 
the healing potential of religious practices and outlooks.3 Clearly there are dangers 
alongside advantages in bringing religion and mental health into closer contact, hence 
there have been calls for caution and for the current popularity of therapies and practices 
that are derived from religious traditions – ‘mindfulness’ being the most high-profile 
example – not to be allowed to obscure the philosophical and methodological 
incompatibilities that may exist between the worlds of religion and the psy disciplines.4  
 From a historical point of view, one of the major questions raised by this trend 
towards a renewed dialogue between religion and the psy disciplines5, is whether what 
are supposedly being brought into closer contact here ever existed apart from one 
another in the first place, in any clearly definable way. Might it be, instead, that our 
current understanding of them as separate is at least in part the result of processes akin 
to what Thomas Gieryn called ‘boundary work’: intellectual and institutional efforts, 
often ideologically motivated, at artificially carving out domains of responsibility and 
expertise over time, at the expense of rival disciplines or ideas? One thinks in particular 
of the modern marginalization of religion as something irredeemably anti-rational, 
epitomized by cognitive beliefs about the world that are manifestly false, reducible to 
human psychological need, and superseded in any conceivable practical benefits by 
modern humanist psychotherapies and communitarianism.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In supporting my research on early psychoanalysis in Japan I am grateful to very many people and 
organizations. For making possible this essay in particular, I would like to register my thanks to the family 
of Kosawa Heisaku, in particular Kosawa Yorio and Kosawa Makoto, along with Geoffrey Blowers, 
Inoue Yoshinobu, Iwata Fumiaki, Kanaseki Takeshi, Kano Rikihachiro, Matsuki Kunihiro, Margaret Ries, 
Sato Yuji, Suzuki Akihito, Takeda Makoto, Wakida Yoshiyuki, Yoshinaga Shin’ichi, and of course ‘Mr 
Fukuda’, and Setouchi Jakuchō and her assistants. I am grateful also to the Japanese Society for the 
Promotion of Science, the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee, the Carnegie Fund, and the British 
Academy, for helping to fund this research.  
2 I borrow this term from Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: the Shaping of the Private Self (1990). 
3 See, for example, the work of the UK Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Spirituality and Psychiatry Special 
Interest Group. 
4 As Robert Kugelmann has pointed out, psychology’s ‘secular’ status has tended to obscure the fact that 
it is embedded in philosophical assumptions of its own. Robert Kugelmann, Psychology and Catholicism: 
Contesting Boundaries (2011). 
5 See Christopher Harding, forthcoming: ‘Problems and Possibilities in the Religion-Psy Dialogue: A 
Framework and the View from India and Japan’. 
6 See Herbert Fingarette, on how the psychologization of religion has been part of a modern project to 
remove it from the sphere of the public, the objective, and the legitimate. Herbert Fingarette, The Self in 
Transformation: Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and the Life of the Spirit (1963). On ‘boundary work’ see 
Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and 
interests in professional ideologies of scientists’, American Sociological Review 48:6 (1983). 
The psychodynamic tradition, from Freud and Jung onwards, has of course been 
greatly interested in religion, both because of the tradition’s characteristic view of 
mental health and illness not as clearly dichotomous states but as a continuum that 
encompasses (and so warrants analytic attention towards) all of human experience, and 
because behavioural characteristics understood to be connected to a religious upbringing 
and outlook, from guilt to scrupulousness, have been a feature of so many seminal 
analyses and theories. Both Freud and Jung approached religion in the modernist, 
functional mood of their time – in terms of what it does, for or against the interests of an 
individual or a society, whether in the Freudian sense of helping to bolster civilized 
society (a role for which Freud hoped religion would one day no longer be required7) or 
in the Jungian vein of providing support in an individual’s process of individuation.8 
This ‘rationalization’ – in the Weberian sense – of religion was a form of boundary 
work, firmly delineating the proper purviews of religion and the psy disciplines and 
contrasting them to one another. The former was now domesticated by the latter as a 
socio-cultural and a psychological phenomenon. This boundary work was more 
successful in Freud’s psychology – though it has been criticized9 – than in Jung’s. 
Freud’s response to the French poet and mystic Romain Rolland, who accused him of 
missing the rootedness of religion in an individual’s profound (‘oceanic’) experience – 
his or her ‘feeling for the ‘eternal’’10 – is instructive. Rolland had been willing, even 
eager, for religious experience to be subjected to scientific, particularly psychological, 
scrutiny, because the future he hoped for was one in which science and religion came 
together to cut through illusion and self-deception of all kinds (including immature 
forms of religiosity), and honestly to pursue truth and justice.11 And yet Freud met 
Rolland’s challenge by making Rolland himself the starting point of Civilization and Its 
Discontents, in which Freud sought to explain – or explain away – the oceanic feeling in 
terms of a developmental quirk that allowed an individual’s pre-Oedipal, primary ego-
feeling to persist into, or reappear in, later life.12 Although, as William Parsons has 
pointed out, Freud seemed tacitly to offer a distinction between the common man’s 
religion and the more elevated sort practiced by someone like Rolland (hoping, it 
seemed, to preserve both his arguments in The Future of an Illusion and his friendship 
with Rolland), nevertheless for Freud religion, as a phenomenon ultimately arising from 
the body just like any other feature of individual and collective human behaviour, was 
open to explanation in the same way as any other aspect of culture.13 
 For Jung, on the other hand, as for many others since who have been interested 
in ‘post-critical belief’ – or what Paul Ricoeur described as a ‘second naiveté’ – an 
intellectual account of religion was compatible with its ongoing positive power in a 
person’s life because the two ran along separate, parallel tracks. It was a question of 
concepts/signs on the one hand, and on the other irreducible symbols, channelling the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (1927). 
8 See Jung, ‘Psychological Commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation: On the Difference 
Between Eastern and Western Thinking’, The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: 
West and East (1958). See also Robert A. Segal, ‘Jung as Psychologist of Religion and Jung as 
Philosopher of Religion’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 55/3 (2010); Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the 
Therapeutic (1966); Michael F. Palmer, Freud and Jung on Religion (1997). 
9 See, e.g., William W. Meissner, Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience (1984). 
10 Letter from Romain Rolland to Sigmund Freud, 3rd December 1927, reproduced in William B. Parsons, 
The Enigma of the Oceanic Experience (1999). 
11 See Parsons, op cit, pp. 63-6.  
12 See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Chapter 1. 
13 See Parsons, op cit, pp. 42-4. 
potency of the experiential and facilitating the healing power of the unconscious.14 The 
question of whether or not Jung’s ‘processes of the psyche’ had any metaphysical, 
transcendent correlates or implications was left undetermined by Jung,15 who professed 
himself lacking in competence on such matters, being (only) a psychologist – though at 
times he seemed to let slip his ideas and hopes.16 Either way, Jung blurred Freud’s 
boundary work by implicitly positing a shared terrain for religion and the psy disciplines 
– that of symbol and myth – of which no adequate conceptual meta-account can be 
given.  
 Boundary work between traditions and systems concerned with the self and its 
development was powerfully in evidence in Meiji Japan too, linked with the emergence 
and evolution of neologisms and related realms of new and revitalized disciplines and 
institutions: shūkyō, tetsugaku, shinrigaku/ryōhō, seishinigaku/ryōhō, and indeed 
seishinbunseki. Recent work by Shimazono Susumu, Janine Anderson Sawada, Gerald 
Figal, Gerard Clinton Godart, and Jason Ananda Josephson appears to coalesce broadly 
around the view that Japan inherited from the late Tokugawa era – and from earlier 
yamabushi culture – a concern with the shaping and cultivation of the self, often through 
systematized bodily practices. Onto this was then imposed a new conceptual matrix 
formed from Japanese versions of modern western categories, reinforced by the 
government’s state-building agenda and the new university and clinical institutions that 
were beneficiaries of these political priorities.17 This role played by politics in the 
formation and early manipulation of new concepts and institutions is clear in Figal’s 
study of the Buddhist reformer and pioneer of shinriryōhō, Inoue Enryō: Inoue was 
interested in defending a reformed Buddhism, combatting the influence of Christianity, 
and in being seen to support government policy of the time in ridding Japan of 
‘superstition’ – the precise dividing line between meishin (superstition) and shūkyō 
(religion) was itself established through yet further processes of boundary work.18  
The present-day renaissance of religious praxis as ‘therapeutic’, and the 
questions and doubts that surround how we delineate the ‘religious’ versus the ‘psy’, 
make this a good time to re-examine the life and work of Kosawa Heisaku: an individual 
central to Japanese psychoanalysis, whose religious commitments have generally been 
taken for granted rather than explored in any detail. In this essay, which is part of on-
going work both on Kosawa and on the lay analyst Ohtsuki Kenji, to both of whose 
personal papers I have been privileged to receive access in recent months, I offer some 
thoughts on the place of religion in Kosawa’s psychoanalytic ideas and therapy. Rather 
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14 As Jung put it: ‘[Myth and symbol] express the processes of the psyche far more trenchantly and, in the 
end, far more clearly than the clearest concept; for the symbol not only conveys a visualisation of the 
process, but – and this is perhaps just as important – it also brings a re-experiencing of it. Jung, op cit, p. 
199. 
15 As James Heisig puts it, ‘the ontological status of ego and Self in Jung’s writing is ambivalent at best, 
muddled at worst. Depending on the context, they are alluded to as energies, forces, functions, classes of 
phenomena, archetypes, or entities’. James Heisig, ‘Jung, Christianity, and Buddhism’, in Polly Young-
Eisendrath & Shoji Muramoto (eds), Awakening and Insight: Zen Buddhism and Psychotherapy (2002), p. 
50. 
16 Jung famously declared, late in life, that he didn’t ‘believe’ in God, he ‘knew’.  
17 Susumu Shimazono, Iyasu Chi no Keifu (2003); Janine Anderson Sawada, Practical Pursuits: Religion, 
Politics, and Personal Cultivation in Nineteenth-Century Japan (2004); Gerald A. Figal, Civilization and 
Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan (1999); Gerard Clinton Godart, ‘‘Philosophy’ or 
‘Religion’? The Confrontation with Foreign Categories in Late Nineteenth Century Japan’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 69:1 (2008); Joseph Ananda Josephson, The Invention of Religion in Japan (2012). 
18 See Figal, op cit. 
method, especially by Maeda Shigeharu19, I base my analysis on a reading of Kosawa’s 
personal correspondence and the recollections of two of his former clients. One of these 
clients was the last of Kosawa’s career: the novelist Setouchi Harumi, who following 
her taking of Buddhist vows (receiving the name Setouchi Jakuchō) became arguably 




Four elements seem to have been crucial to the formation of Kosawa’s theory and 
therapeutic practice, although it is important not to assume too much at the outset about 
the solidity of such a categorization: his own personal experience, especially from early 
through to late childhood; typical early twentieth-century Japanese family structures and 
expectations (for relatively wealthy families, at any rate); the Jōdo Shinshū (or ‘Shin’) 
sect of Japanese Buddhism, which emphasized the surrender of a fragile human being to 
something greater, encompassing, and – on some readings of the Ajase story – maternal 
in the way that human beings experience it; and the new discipline of psychoanalysis, to 
which Kosawa became attracted while at university. Two aspects in particular of 
Kosawa’s childhood have been linked to the development of his theory and therapeutic 
style. Firstly, both Takeda Makoto and Kita Keiko have suggested that Kosawa’s time 
with his ten-year old nanny – in particular his separation from his mother and on one 
occasion the experience of being tied to a tree while the other children played – may 
have contributed significantly towards both his feeling of an existential grudge and his 
longing for the maternal.20 Secondly, Kosawa’s son, Yorio, noted that his father’s 
hospitalization with serious eye problems as a boy was probably crucial to the 
intensification of his involvement with Shin Buddhism, which had begun with his 
acquaintance with the Shin Buddhist priest Chikazumi Jōkan a couple of years earlier.21  
Letters written to family and colleagues during and just after Kosawa’s time in 
Vienna in 1932-3 – during which he had a training analysis with Richard Sterba, was 
supervised by Paul Federn, and spent time working on his thesis – shed new light on 
Kosawa’s mixed familial and religious concerns in this early period of his life.22 It is 
now clear that despite the weight usually placed on Kosawa’s months of training with 
major European psychoanalysts, Richard Sterba thought that Kosawa’s time with him 
had amounted to ‘nothing more than the opening phase of an analysis’.23 Nevertheless, 
Sterba believed himself to have acquired, even in this short time, a reliable sense of what 
was driving Kosawa in his early adult relationships and work: he noted Kosawa’s 
tremendously aggressive attitude towards his father – which ‘clearly stemmed from the 
Oedipus Complex’ – together with a ‘childlike dependence and close connection to [his] 
mother’. Sterba thought he saw these early childhood experiences playing out in the 
young adult Kosawa, in what Kosawa told him of his problematic relationship with 
Professor Marui Kiyoyasu in Sendai.24 Twenty years later Kosawa’s student, Doi Takeo, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Maeda Shigeharu, Jiyūrensōhō Oboegaki (1984).	  
20 See Takeda Makoto, Seishinbunseki to Bukkyō (1990); Kita Keiko, ‘Mondai ha taiji kara’, in Okonogi 
Keigo & Kitayama Osamu (eds), Ajase Konpurekkusu (2001). 
21 See Iwata Fumiaki, Kindaika no naka no dentōshūkyō to seishinundō: Kijunten toshite no Chikazumi 
Jōkan kenkyū (2011); Kosawa Yorio, ‘Chichi, Kosawa Heisaku to Ajase Konpurekkusu’, in Okonogi & 
Kitayama (eds), op cit. 
22 For a broader account of Kosawa’s visit to Europe, and the first generation of Japanese psychoanalysts 
more broadly, see Geoffrey H Blowers and Serena Yang Hsueh Chi, “Freud's Deshi: the Coming of 
Psychoanalysis to Japan,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 33, no. 2 (1997): 115–126. 
23 Letter from Richard Sterba to Kosawa Heisaku, 10th January 1936. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
24 Ibid. 
in criticizing Kosawa’s style of analysis, made related suggestions about Kosawa’s 
penchant for the maternal – both an attachment to the figure of his mother and to a 
motherly style as an analyst.25   
One wonders whether, had Kosawa spent longer in analysis with Sterba, his 
Ajase Complex theory, on which he was working while in Vienna, might have turned 
out rather differently. It seems that the real significance of Kosawa’s time in Vienna lay 
not so much in the training and mentoring he received there, though this was crucial to 
his later professional status in Japan, but rather the insights about his own life arising at 
least in part from his analysis with Sterba and very possibly from the chance to reflect 
that was afforded to him by spending an extended period of time away from Japan. 
Kosawa confided to his brother, Ichiro, that he actually thought very little of 
psychoanalysis as it was practiced in Vienna: with the exception of Freud, he thought 
that his own method of therapy and understanding of psychoanalysis was superior to 
everyone he had met in Vienna, and that it wasn’t worth wasting too much time and 
money being analyzed in Europe – he was eager instead to return home to begin work.26 
He felt vindicated in this judgment when Federn himself made approving comments 
about Kosawa’s developing thesis27, and when he suggested at one point that Kosawa 
really didn’t need any further analytic training with him and should instead move on to 
more advanced matters.28 Kosawa also wrote to his brother about the thinking he had 
been doing where their father was concerned: he noted that he had finally managed to 
get his interview with Freud almost exactly one year after their father’s death: although 
their father had had his bad points, Kosawa reflected, he had surely been an incarnation 
of Amida – ‘Amida no gonge’ – and was now looking after him. Everything, Kosawa 
added, is the work of mihotoke, the work of the Buddha. He vowed to his brother that he 
would return to Japan as soon as he could, and would present his finished thesis at their 
father’s grave.29 
 
Following his return from Europe, Kosawa’s new practice in Tokyo garnered interest 
from clients at a rapid rate. Extant client records suggest that Kosawa saw at least four 
hundred new clients between 1933 and 1936 – possibly more, since it is not possible to 
determine whether, and how many, client records from that period may have been lost. 
Kosawa’s diagnoses at this point, detailed in notes written partly in German and partly 
in Japanese, included obsessional neurosis, depression, schizophrenia, hysteria, 
kleptomania, alcoholism (of which Kosawa had seen a great deal at the hospital in 
Vienna where he had worked30), stutter, and fear of leprosy. Only a small proportion of 
these new clients entered long-term analysis with Kosawa, with the majority of the 
records indicating just a single visit or a short series of visits.  
Besides the clients who came to Kosawa in person, a large number of people 
wrote to him seeking advice, both before and after the war – particularly from the mid-
1950s, following the publication of Kosawa’s translations of books by Karl Menninger. 
Here Kosawa seemed to benefit from the social and professional boundary work that 
was taking place in Japan between the German-influenced university psychiatry of the 
day, which was concerned mainly with research and with major psychoses, and the 
range of more intimate, accessible, clinic-based therapies that straddled medicine, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Letter from Doi Takeo to Kosawa Heisaku, 28th October 1953. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
26 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Kosawa Ichiro, 15th April 1932. Kosawa Family Private Collection.	  
27 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Kosawa Ichiro, May 1932. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
28 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Kosawa Ichiro, 10th April 1932. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
29 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Kosawa Ichiro, 15th April 1932. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
30 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to his mother, 15th April 1932. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
religion, folk healing, and self-cultivation. Although the fact that Kosawa was 
constrained to work outside the university system is often cited as one of the reasons 
why both he and psychoanalysis exerted less influence than they might have done in the 
prewar and immediate postwar periods, Kosawa clearly made a virtue of the situation. 
The newspaper adverts and the signboards that he placed around Tokyo explicitly 
encouraged people to contact him about any little thing that might be bothering them – 
one newspaper advert mentioned ‘sōdan, oyobi shidō’: consultation/advice and 
guidance. People took him at his word, particularly during the peak period for his 
psychoanalytical practice after the war. One woman wrote to him with the concern that 
her child had become interested in Christianity and was considering the monastic life. 
Was this a mental health problem, she wanted to know? A young male correspondent 
said he really loved strong women and that he became sexually aroused in exams when 
the ‘five minutes left’ announcement was made – he wanted to know whether this was 
normal. And a second young man had recently met two women on arranged dates 
(omiai) and wanted Kosawa’s help to decide which of the two he should pursue.31 
 It is impossible to determine at what length, on average, Kosawa replied to such 
letters. He did, however, see real therapeutic value in such epistolary exchanges: this is 
clear from his development of the method of tsūshin bunseki, or psychoanalysis by 
correspondence. Kosawa began to develop the method after a patient, constrained to 
finish his analysis with Kosawa early after thirty-three sessions, suffered a relapse but 
was unable to come back for therapy. Kosawa wondered whether written free 
associations, with which he had been experimenting personally, might ‘serve the same 
purpose as spoken free associations’. After nine exchanges of letters, the patient had 
been relieved of his symptoms, and Kosawa reported that his new method had gone on 
to prove useful in twelve other cases so far, including a patient suffering ambulatory 
schizophrenia. He also used it for a while with Doi Takeo.32 Karl Menninger, to whom 
Kosawa wrote about tsūshin bunseki, showed some initial concern over Kosawa’s 
approach, but agreed with Kosawa that Freud had used something similar with a number 
of his acquaintances. In his correspondence with Menninger, Kosawa made a 
conciliatory move by saying that this was obviously not ‘psychoanalysis’ as such, but 
rather ‘psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy by mail’. Yet he insisted that he was 
faithfully developing Freud’s own experiments with written free association, in a way 
that Freud’s other disciples had overlooked.33 
Showing a similar attitude in dealing with Menninger as he had with Freud, in 
being led less by professional niceties and etiquette than by the questions that most fired 
his enthusiasm, Kosawa added to his unconventional discussion of tsūshin bunseki by 
volunteering in a letter that his ‘religious belief’ played a role in his therapy. Although 
the letter that Kosawa promised to send Menninger on this topic appears never to have 
been written – perhaps a consequence of the various pressures on Kosawa in the mid-
1950s and then his worsening health from the late 1950s onwards34 – other aspects of his 
correspondence with Menninger are revealing of how features of human experience that 
we might naturally separate out into religion, family, and therapy featured in Kosawa’s 
life and work in a way that transcended, or was prior to, such separations. On one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Letters sent to Kosawa Heisaku, dated respectively: (postmark indistinct); 6th December 1954; 23rd 
August 1954. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
32 Letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Karl Menninger, 4th September 1953. Menninger Archives. 
33 Ibid. Menninger suggested that Kosawa contribute an article on the subject to the Bulletin of the 
Menninger Clinic. Letter from Karl Menninger to Kosawa Heisaku, 17th September 1953. Menninger 
Archives.	  
34 Kosawa made this promise to Menninger in a letter dated 29th June 1953. Menninger Archives. 
occasion, Kosawa posed a question to Menninger – ‘This is important to me’, he said of 
it – which is worth quoting at length: 
 
In my clinical experience as a psychoanalyst, there were occasions in which either the 
father or the mother of my clients died or met accident while the patient was showing 
good progress. In view of the psychological relationship between my patients and their 
parents, especially the effect of my patients’ recovery from their neuroses upon their 
parents, these incidents gave me food for much thought. 
 
I was wondering: assuming that the life of one person was absorbed by another person 
so that the latter may survive (recover from neuroses), and that the life of the former 
was eventually impaired or interrupted; and assuming that man prefers to stay in this 
world retaining the physical body, [rather than] departing to the other world – how am 
I to interpret the foregoing phenomena? 
 
I mean to say: there are occasions in which the parent’s physical welfare is affected 
when his (her) child’s neurosis is relieved. In other words, the parent might live 15 
years provided that his (her) child remained neurotic, whereas the parent might live 
only 10 years if (and when) the child is cured of its neuroses. 
 
The question is this: should the parent be content to see his (her) child recover – revive 
– even at the cost of his (her) life (longevity)? If one could believe in the spiritual life 
after death, there is no question.  
 
Kosawa went on in this letter to ponder the fact that three people involved in the recent 
Japanese translation of Menninger’s The Human Mind had since fallen ill, including 
Kosawa himself, with one of them already dead and another dying of tuberculosis. As an 
extension of his idea that the positive progress of a patient might adversely affect the 
health of someone close to them, Kosawa wondered whether ‘these happenings [to 
people involved with The Human Mind translation] represent the process of one’s self-
destructive instinct being liquidated, thanks to the psychoanalysis effected by ‘The 
Human Mind’’.35  
 The first thing to note here is that Kosawa was writing to Menninger from his 
‘sick bed… [where he was] confronted with profound problems of life’ – an echo of his 
hospitalization more than thirty years before, which his son Yorio claimed had deepened 
his commitment to Shin Buddhism. Kosawa was clearly thinking over the high cost to 
his health of his efforts at promoting psychoanalysis in Japan, and was linking this to the 
clinical phenomenon he had observed of parents suffering for the progress of their 
children. This seems to have been more than merely a useful metaphor, of Kosawa 
‘fathering’ – perhaps ‘mothering’ would be more apt, given his maternal instinct – 
psychoanalysis in Japan: familial connectedness, the metaphysical fate of the person, 
religion, and science are all present here, as Kosawa thinks out loud to Menninger. 
However, here as elsewhere, it is difficult to know precisely how Kosawa understood 
how all these things interrelated – or whether indeed he ever arrived at a settled 
understanding at all. What, for example, does Kosawa mean when he talks of ‘the other 
world’ and ‘spiritual life after death’ – especially given the room within Shin Buddhism 
for interpreting the ‘Pure Land’ as a state of continued existence after death or as 
something more akin to a liberation from the ‘agonizing pattern of alternation’ between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Undated letter from Kosawa Heisaku to Karl Menninger. Menninger Archives. 
life and death, good and bad?36 We might loosely look at this as the evocative language 
– half questioning, half hopeful – of faith and intimacy, especially when set alongside 
Kosawa’s comments to his brother about their father. We might also recall a feature both 
of Kosawa’s and Ohtsuki’s writing when it came to dealing with western, and 
particularly American colleagues, who were unfamiliar with the Japanese religious and 
philosophical context: both men tended to shift their rhetorical ground to cater for 
western cultural sensibilities, by talking about ‘God’ or, as in Ohtsuki’s case, trying to 
spell out differences between the philosophical dualism of mainstream western 
Christianity – a deity that transcends its creation – and the non-dual Buddhist way of 
seeing the world, which Ohtsuki thought was closer to the truth of things and more 
compatible with psychoanalysis.37 
Perhaps the interpretation of Kosawa’s comments that fits most reliably with the 
rest of his writings is this: that he prioritized first-person experience and the means for 
living life well, over and above philosophical analysis or the construction of meta-
theories. In a revealing comment to Menninger, Kosawa wrote: ‘It is really a sad truth 
that I have been the only one who not only propagated psychoanalytical knowledge but 
practiced and lived it’.38 It was in the practicing and the living that Kosawa most valued 
psychoanalysis – this was partly the cause, of course, of his break with the heavily 
theoretical Marui – and in which he saw little to distinguish psychoanalysis from Jōdo 
Shinshū. Indeed, he claimed that Freud himself had had a great semi-religious 
experience when fighting inside his small psychoanalytic circle in the early years had 
helped him to see that no-one, not even doctors and fully analyzed psychoanalysts, were 
free from imperfection and from resistances. ‘By this experience’, Kosawa wrote, in 
English-language notes for a public address, ‘Freudism was firmly established. This 
spirit is truly fitted to the work of our Saint Shinran… there is no difference between 
these two spirits.39 In the same notes he reminded himself and exhorted his audience – a 
mix of scientists and doctors, it seems40 – to: 
 
…study over and over again, tracing… the route of Freud and then consider [it] for 
ourselves. I use the word ‘route’ of Freud instead of ‘science’. The science of Freud is 
his human character itself and the route that he walked. It is not a preparation of 
medicine kept secret by an old doctor’s house [school of thought], not a moral principle 
of an abstract sort usually [offered] by certain Oriental sages, but a route anyone can 
find and reach if he does his best.41  
 
For Kosawa, both Shinran and Freud were engaged in an effort to make clarity of seeing 
their bedrock in life, and to show others how they might achieve it for themselves. This 
seems to fit with Kosawa’s broad cultural inheritance from Inoue Enryō’s pragmatic 
application of psychology in general healing and in combatting superstition, and with 
Kosawa’s more direct and personal inheritance from his Shin Buddhist mentor 
Chikazumi Jōkan. Work by Iwata Fumiaki and Michael Radich has shown the extent to 
which Kosawa drew on Chikazumi’s personal experiences and writing in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See K Shingu and T Funaki, “‘Between Two Deaths’: the Intersection of Psychoanalysis and Japanese 
Buddhism,” Theory & Psychology 18, no. 2 (April 1, 2008), p. 254.	  
37 Ohtsuki Kenji, Draft notes for a book on Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, Ohtsuki Kenji Archives, 
Waseda University. 
38 Letter from Heisaku Kosawa to Karl Menninger, 29th June 1953. Emphasis added. Menninger Archives. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The precise details are not clear from Kosawa’s notes. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
41 Notes entitled ‘Principle of Freud’. Kosawa Family Private Collection. 
formulation of his Ajase Complex theory: Iwata makes clear that Chikazumi’s own 
experience of illness and salvation played a part in Kosawa’s connection of the Ajase 
story to the psychological dynamics of family life and the possibilities for salvific 
consideration of one’s nature and destiny that these provide – or, rather, sometimes force 
upon an individual.42  
What, then, is this ‘seeing’, this ‘route of Freud’? In the Jōdo Shinshū tradition 
seeing one’s own weakness in particular is crucially important, because this awareness 
helps give rise to shinjin, or ‘true entrusting’: a dynamic blend of an act and an 
experience, which carries salvific potential – or which, on some readings, is itself the 
experience of being saved, of knowing that you have reached ‘the stage of the truly 
settled’.43 Shinran had left behind the Tendai Buddhist order because he felt unable to 
continue with its complex ritual and intellectual life. His focus instead became the 
implications of what he realized was his own absolute helplessness and that of other 
human beings. He came to emphasize the importance of the nembutsu and of tariki, 
‘other power’ – or the power of the Other to reach into human life and help to effect 
salvation. For Shinran humans are so unable truly to do good by themselves that even 
the recitation of the nembutsu cannot be considered a self-generated act: the initiative is 
ultimately being taken by the Other, by the celestial Buddha Amida, who grants human 
beings a share in his merit and guarantees their rebirth, after death, in his Pure Land.44 
As the Shin Buddhist educator and poet Kai Wariko, a near contemporary of Kosawa, 
put it:  
 
The voice with which I call Amida Buddha 
Is the voice with which Amida Buddha calls to me. 
 
In other words, the point at which, and the means by which, we believe ourselves to be 
seeking some kind of salvation, to be ‘calling’ Amida Buddha, is in fact the point at 
which, and means by which something from outside (and yet at the same time intimately 
us), is seeking that salvation for us and through us. For Kosawa, influenced by his own 
personal experience, as well as by Chikazumi’s life and by what he read of Prince Ajase, 
the fundamental emotional challenges of the family situation give rise in the individual 
to an awareness of his or her inescapable weakness, in a way that has salvific potential 
in these Shin Buddhist terms.  
There is little in Kosawa’s writing, or in others’ testimony about him, to suggest 
that he thought about any of this in terms of a dualism of the transcendent and the 
material, of the sort that might encourage him to regard a person’s familial and 
psychological situation as manifestations of – or correlates of – some separate 
underlying metaphysical order (and which might in turn imply that psychological trauma 
and healing fulfill some kind of supra-psychological purpose). ‘Religion versus 
psychoanalysis’ would have been for Kosawa an unnecessary juxtaposition, although he 
was committed to maintaining the integrity of their differing languages and methods and 
to fulfilling the professional requirements of the practicing psychiatrist and 
psychoanalyst. This would seem to fit well with the observation frequently made about 
Japanese philosophy and aesthetics, that the phenomenal world is regarded as absolute.45 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Iwata Fumiaki, op cit. 
43 See Shingu & Funaki, op cit.	  	  
44 See Morris J. Augustine, ‘The Buddhist Notion of Faith’, in Robert Traer, “Faith in the Buddhist 
Tradition,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 11 (1991): 85–120, p. 88. See also Alfred Bloom, Shinran’s 
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Tendai Buddhism is said to capture this in the notion of honkaku hōmon, which implies 
that enlightenment is a matter of properly understanding the phenomenal rather than 
somehow moving away from it, while Zen Buddhism’s Dōgen wrote that ‘the real 
aspect is all things’.46 Whether we regard this account of the Japanese view of the world 
as perennially accurate, at least in a broad sense, or as a modern essentialization of a 
more complex prior set of traditions, it is clear that in the Buddhist and philosophical 
circles of Kosawa’s day, such a view was not uncommon.47 
 Let us pursue this point by referring to the experience of two of Kosawa’s 
clients, with whom I have recently conducted interviews. Mr Fukuda, as we shall call 
him, went to Kosawa in the mid-1940s plagued by fundamental self-doubt, which had 
tipped over into neurosis. Fukuda partly blames an old ethics teacher of his during the 
war, who taught pupils that a ‘true man of character’ would never display any emotion. 
Fukuda had put his hand up in class to ask whether the having of emotions was 
permitted, and being told that yes it was, he proceeded to ask more questions. The 
teacher apparently became quite angry, and put a stop to the exchange by accusing 
Fukuda of being a pointless quibbler and possibly a Communist to boot. This didn’t 
settle things for Fukuda, and when he walked past Kosawa’s house in 1946, and noticed 
a sign saying ‘seishinbunseki’, he decided to knock on the door. He ended up in therapy 
for around a year, towards the end of which time he recalls walking along the street and 
suddenly experiencing a falling away of his sense of self, replaced by what he calls a 
sense of ‘being lived’, or ‘lived through’ by another, by something else. Not only did Mr 
Fukuda attribute this life-changing event to the effects of intensive analysis with 
Kosawa, but when he told Kosawa about it he received strong confirmation: this, said 
Kosawa, is the altered sense of selfhood at which psychoanalysis aims but which it 
seems to struggle to achieve. Kosawa went on to say that without this sort of experience 
at its heart psychoanalysis would fail to progress. Although Kosawa never talked about 
Buddhism during Mr Fukuda’s analyses, the two frequently discussed it over tea once 
the morning or afternoon’s analysis was over, as a natural complement to what had gone 
before. On at least one occasion Kosawa proudly showed Mr Fukuda a scroll that had 
been given to him by Chikazumi Jōkan, and on a number of occasions took Mr Fukuda 
along to talks at the Kyūdōkaikan Buddhist centre that Chikazumi had established.48 
 Setouchi Jakuchō’s experiences with Kosawa resonate somewhat with those of 
Mr Fukuda.49 She had no interest in Buddhism when she visited Kosawa in the mid-
1960s. Instead, she went to Kosawa because the tangled relationships with men that she 
had turned into her first major literary success in 1963 – the novel Natsu no Owari (The 
End of Summer) – had finally overtaken her. At the age of forty, she was proud of 
having survived on her own wits and talent since her divorce, and she had weathered 
allegations of pornography against her early work and could now count luminaries such 
as Kawabata Yasunari and Mishima Yukio among her friends (Setouchi only found out 
later, just after she read his novel Ongaku, that Mishima too had been seeing Kosawa, 	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and to her regret she never spoke about Kosawa with Mishima). Yet she had begun to 
suffer from what she now sees as having been the total loss of her ‘power of judgment’. 
This manifested in physical terms when she started to drop things, and when on one 
occasion she tried to travel backwards up a department store escalator. At the same time 
she was, in her own words, ‘starting to become a bit strange’50: she used to talk 
obsessively, non-stop to her friends, sometimes throughout the night, barely realizing 
what she was doing. Her friend Shibaoka Haruko decided to intervene, and realizing 
Setouchi’s dislike of conventional doctors and medical institutions, recommended that 
she go to see Kosawa – perhaps another example of the social and professional 
boundary work of this period working in favour of someone seen as standing outside 
institutional medicine. Kosawa was no longer seeing clients, but with Shibaoka as a 
mutual acquaintance, and with Kosawa’s interest in Setouchi’s work on Okamoto 
Kanoko (Setouchi published Kanoko Ryōran in 1965), a connection was established and 
Kosawa agreed to treat her. 
 As with Mr Fukuda, Setouchi recalls Kosawa’s therapeutic method with great 
clarity. Although Kosawa never talked about Buddhism during or after their analytic 
sessions, of which there were around eight in total, Kosawa’s personal and professional 
rootedness in the practical confluence of Shinran and Freud – captured in the phrase he 
often repeated to Fukuda: ‘Shinran no kokoro wo motte, seishinbunseki wo suru’ – came 
through powerfully, Setouchi recalls. What for Doi was the unpleasant sensation of 
being ‘drunk’ or ‘devoured’ by Kosawa’s maternalism was for Setouchi the natural 
demeanour of a ‘lovely, lovely man’: 
 
He was wonderful, so gentle. He guided me into the parlour area of his house and, after 
listening to me talk for a little while, he asked me to lie back on the couch with my eyes 
closed while he sat just behind my head. ‘Now that your eyes are closed,’ he said, 
‘you’ll be seeing images floating up in front of you. I want you just to name each one as 
it appears. As though you’re on a train looking out of the window, watching the scenery 
pass before you.’51 
 
Setouchi remembers being able to do this from the very outset, without difficulty, and 
feeling immeasurably lighter at the end of every session – a successful example of 
Kosawa’s torokashi technique. The lightness was not merely an unburdening but also a 
growing sense that her previous, independent image of herself was in the process of 
being radically revised: 
 
I’d always thought that it was me making my way in this world, until I went to Kosawa’s 
house. I’d become a novelist because I had talent; my books sold because I had talent — 
plus a bit of luck. That’s not how I see it any more. There’s no one born into this world 
because they decided they would be. You’re not born, you’re born by something [nanika 
ni umaresaserareru]. 
Although Setouchi later joined the Tendai order, she links this ‘nanika’ with the other-
power in which Shin Buddhism takes a great interest. Her experience in therapy with 
Kosawa, which echoes that of Fukuda – both emphasise this altered sense of self, and 
both use the word ‘ikasareru’ (to be made to live) in connection with the therapeutic 
experience – was enhanced by the regular compliment that Kosawa would pay Setouchi, 	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51 Interview with Setouchi Jakuchō, October 2012. 
about her kimono, or her handbag, as he saw her to the door. This may seem a minor 
detail, but for Setouchi it was integral to the overall effect of the psychoanalytic therapy: 
she remembers that this sort of treatment at the hands of another human being was like 
nothing else in her life at the time, and she now tries to pass it on in the context of her 
work with individuals and groups: 
 
When people come to me for help now, I listen to them and at the end I always find some 
little thing to compliment them on. You should see them: they derive so much energy 
from that. When people are suffering, when they have some kind of complex, or when 
they’re lonely, they need someone to notice them, simply to recognise them. So when 
someone who’s in real trouble comes to me now, I think to myself, ‘What was it that 





It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that Kosawa was not interested in how the 
shared aspirations and methodologies of Buddhism and psychoanalysis might be 
expressible at a theoretical level. In concluding this essay, I will examine briefly just 
two areas in which Kosawa in fact showed a considerable critical interest in religion and 
therapy: firstly, the false hope offered by new religions, and the need instead for 
Japanese people to place their trust in the sturdy, more challenging truths of science and 
traditional religion; and secondly, the points of connection between specific Buddhist 
and psychoanalytic ideas.  
For Kosawa there was no dichotomy to be explored between true science and 
true religion, because they aimed at the same thing; rather, the crucial dichotomy lay 
between true science and religion, on the one hand, and false religion, false comfort, on 
the other. Epitomizing all that was false in his own time was the ‘transient phenomena’ 
of the new religions, which he feared were actively taking advantage of social problems 
– not least by engaging in postwar radio preaching.53 Although Kosawa had famously 
disagreed with Freud’s theory of religion – indeed, as Iwata Fumiaki has shown, a 
defence of traditional Japanese religion against anti-religionists in Japan (as well as 
Freud’s rather parochial insights) was the starting point for Kosawa’s first published 
piece on the Ajase Complex – he recalled with approval, in a letter to Menninger, 
Freud’s comment that weak people opted for religion whereas the strong persevered 
along the harder road of science.54 Kosawa hoped and expected that in time, Japanese 
people would have the strength to see the new religions for the shallow, opportunistic 
phenomena that they were, and would put their trust instead in true science and in true 
religion.55 He once wrote to his brother to say that a close friend – possibly in fact a 
member of the Kosawa family – was in danger of getting caught up in one of the new 
religions, and he counselled instead that the person concerned should study the writings 
of Chikazumi Jōkan and the Edo-era intellectual Hirata Atsutane.56  
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The only one of the new religions for which Kosawa seems to have had some 
time was Seichō no Ie: writing to his sister, Yoshiko, on one occasion, Kosawa mentions 
that he visited a friend in hospital and was pleased to see a copy of a Seichō no Ie book 
by the bedside.57 He also corresponded with the founder of Seichō no Ie, Taniguchi 
Masaharu, advising him on psychoanalytic theory and at one point treating the same 
patient with him. In his diary, Kosawa recalls going to meet Taniguchi at his house on 
30th May 1946, stopping off on the way to pay homage to Admiral Tōgō at the Meiji 
Shrine (the same day that the Emperor was due to visit the shrine).58 The relationship 
was not uniformly a happy one, however: the two men disagreed over the treatment of 
their shared patient, and at one point their correspondence degenerated into an exchange 
in which Taniguchi referred to Kosawa as ‘a devil’ – to which Kosawa replied bitterly 
that while everyone else, according to Taniguchi’s writings, was God’s child, it seemed 
to be reserved for Kosawa alone to be viewed as a devil.59 
 Kosawa also thought about the question of how particular ideas within Buddhism 
and psychoanalysis might correlate with one another, but he does not seem fully to have 
resolved this – and it is possible that he did not see an urgent need to do so.60 Instead, he 
returned time and again to an attitude towards, and experience of, life and living that 
was founded upon the examples set by Shinran and Freud, but which was prior to – or 
perhaps impossible to capture entirely in terms of – strict religious or psychoanalytic 
formulations. Where Kosawa did think in theoretical terms, it tended to be a matter of 
Buddhist and psychoanalytic ideas reinforcing one another, informed at the same time 
by Kosawa’s own life experience. Writing to Freud in November 1931, for example, 
shortly before leaving for Europe, Kosawa said that when he set Freud’s writing on 
transference alongside his own past experience of interpersonal conflict he finally 
‘found the meaning of the word [transference]’. He even coined a phrase, at this point, 
for a consideration of one’s own past with the transference dynamic in mind: ‘reflexive 
history’.61 The parallels with Morita and Naikan therapies are notable here, both of 
which centre around meditative consideration of past relationships. Perhaps it was a later 
development of this method by Kosawa that had so upset Doi when he complained of 
the way that Kosawa recommended solo free association to his patients, almost as a 
form of meditation.62 
 In the same letter to Freud, Kosawa likened the repetition compulsion to the 
‘redemption of Buddha’.63 This is the most commonly cited connection between 
Japanese psychoanalysis and Buddhism: the very same year that Kosawa wrote his letter 	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to Freud, Yabe Yaekichi visited Freud and told him that the cultural familiarity in Japan, 
thanks to Buddhism, of the idea that life contains within it an impulse towards death had 
guided him and his circle of psychoanalysis enthusiasts in Tokyo (a group that included 
Ohtsuki Kenji) in choosing Beyond the Pleasure Principle as an early introduction to 
Freud for Japanese readers, despite its difficulty as a text. Some time later, in an undated 
letter to his brother Ichiro, Kosawa wondered whether the battle between shi no honnō 
and sei no honnō (death instinct and life instinct) in the psychoanalytic understanding 
could somehow be mapped onto that battle between mumyō (avidya: ignorance) and our 
better instincts with which Shinran had been so concerned.64 Kosawa later pursued these 
questions via a correspondence with a Zen priest by the name of Ōyama Jundō, for 
whom contact with psychoanalysis had helped make Dōgen’s teachings clearer.65 
It seems that Kosawa was still entertaining ideas about the death instinct as a 
bridge between Buddhism and psychoanalysis in the late 1950s. Although the precise 
meaning of his comment to Menninger about the three people who had worked on the 
translation of The Human Mind falling ill is difficult to grasp, Kosawa’s point seemed to 
be that simply by reading Menninger’s writing about psychoanalysis an effect was 
achieved whereby these three people were progressively liberated from the 
psychological investment in the body and its physical health that is associated with the 
pleasure principle. This interpretation of Kosawa’s words seems reasonable (with the 
implication, perhaps, that his use of the word ‘liquidated’ was ambiguous or incorrect), 
since he then went on to write: ‘On the other hand, there is the belief that man’s physical 





A number of recent writers, in particular Shingu Kazushige and Funaki Tetsuo, Chikako 
Ozawa-de Silva, and Iwata Fumiaki, have suggested that the religious and philosophical 
nuances of early Japanese psychoanalysis were somewhat lost in the postwar generation 
and afterwards. The findings in this essay provide support for such arguments, while 
cautioning against applying too-rigid concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘psychoanalysis’ in 
seeking to understand Kosawa Heisaku’s approach to life and psychotherapy. The 
concept of ‘boundary work’ may be useful in helping us to avoid this pitfall. Firstly, it 
reminds us of the fluidity, especially in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Japan, of concepts and institutions concerned with what we typically, perhaps more 
heuristically than we care to admit, use ‘religion’ and the ‘psy disciplines’ to denote – 
both new concepts like shūkyō and shinriryōhō and older Buddhist concepts and 
institutions whose connotations and roles were changing in the wake of the modernist 
spirit. Secondly, it seems clear from Kosawa’s personal writings that for him the world 
of human experience, emotions, and striving to live a good life was more vivid, and of 
greater import, than working through in a conceptual way the implications of being a 
deshi both of Shinran and of Freud. The language of ‘hybridity’ has come to be widely 
used when discussing the life and work of pioneering, multi-cultural intellectuals in Asia 
and other parts of the non-European modern world, but this seems inappropriate for 
Kosawa because to speak of a hybrid of ‘Buddhism’ and ‘psychoanalysis’ fails to 
capture the way in which, for Kosawa, life as a project and a flow of experience came 	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first, with Buddhism and psychoanalysis providing inspiration and corroboration – and 
in that sense being secondary. 
 There is a danger, here, of course, in idealizing in someone like Kosawa that 
which our contemporary world values: his pragmatism and his apparent freedom from 
the constraints of great systems – his willingness, for example, to challenge Freud on 
religion and to extend Freud’s work on written free association beyond that of most of 
his other followers. We must recognize that Kosawa seems simply not to have had the 
time, nor perhaps the inclination, to take a more systematically theoretical approach in 
his work: the pages of his pocket diaries for most of the 1950s are crammed with tiny 
writing detailing a punishing schedule of clients and meetings, and we know that the 
institutional politics of Japanese psychoanalysis absorbed a great deal of his energy, as 
they did that of leaders of psychoanalytic societies in many other countries in the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, there were those amongst Kosawa’s 
students who disliked his therapeutic style intensely: Doi was grateful to Kosawa in a 
number of areas, but also remembered him as a powerful negative example where 
therapeutic method was concerned. Others doubted the thoroughness of Kosawa’s grasp 
of psychoanalytic theory, and certainly, as the evidence offered here from Richard 
Sterba underscores, on the basis of the international standards of the time Kosawa could 
not claim to have been properly analyzed – though nor, of course, could Freud. 
 Perhaps we ought to conclude by allowing the nuance that Kosawa himself 
brought to his defence of tsūshin bunseki to stand for his therapeutic approach as a 
whole. This may not have been psychoanalysis in the most orthodox sense, but rather a 
very particular form of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It was genuinely life changing for 
at least some of the clients who went through it, as the testimony of Mr Fukuda and 
Setouchi Jakuchō shows. And from our present vantage point, as the compatibility is re-
considered of what have evolved as ‘religion’ and the ‘psy disciplines’, Kosawa’s 
therapeutic method seems both strikingly relevant and potentially instructive. Whether 
an intentional lesson, or the happy outcome of his simply being unable to do things any 
other way, the locating of the real ‘boundary work’ between religion and psychoanalysis 
not in the outer, the institutional, and the conceptual but in the primacy of one’s own 
lived experience represents a valuable and lasting contribution. 
 
 
 
 	  
